Economists write Congress about bid program's flaws.
by Cara C. Bachenheimer

With the go-live date for the "competitive" bidding program in
nine areas across the country fast approaching, attention to this
controversial program is growing in Congress. At press time, CMS
had not yet announced the names of the contractors; that
information will be important in determining whether Congress
intervenes before January 1.

One critical development is a recent letter signed by over 160
economists from prestigious universities. Separate from the
industry, these economists wrote to Congress about the fatal flaws
in the bidding program that CMS has constructed. While the
economists did state that competitive bidding can be an effective
tool to control costs without sacrificing quality, they said the
current program, as CMS has designed it, will result in "a failed
government program."

Key comments from their letter follow:

"The first problem is that the auction rules violate a
basic principle of auction design: bids must be binding
commitments.
In the Medicare auction, bidders are not
bound by their bids. Any auction winner can decline to sign a
supply contract following the auction. This undermines the
credibility of bids, and encourages low-ball bids in which the
supplier acquires at no cost the option to sign a supply
contract."

  • "The second problem is a flawed pricing rule.
    As is standard in multi-unit procurement auctions, bids are sorted
    from lowest to highest, and winners are selected, lowest bid first,
    until the cumulative supply quantity equals the estimated demand.
    What is odd is that rather than paying winners the clearing price
    (the last-accepted bid), the auction pays winners the unweighted
    median among the winning bids.

    "This is unique in our collective experience. The result is that
    fifty percent of the winning bidders are offered a contract price
    less than their bids. This median pricing rule further encourages
    low-ball bids, since a low bid guarantees winning, does not affect
    the price and gives the supplier a free option to sign a supply
    contract. Even if suppliers bid their true costs, up to one-half of
    the winning suppliers would reject the supply contract and the
    government would be left with insufficient supply. Others may
    accept the contract and cross-subsidize public patients with the
    revenue from private patients, or just take a loss. This pricing
    rule does not develop a sustainable competitive bidding process or
    healthy supplier pool."

  • "The third problem arises from the use of composite
    bids,
    an average of a bidder's bids across many products
    weighted by government estimated demand. This provides strong
    incentives to distort bids away from costs — the problem of
    bid skewing. Bidders bid low on products where the government
    overestimated demand and high on products where the government
    underestimated demand. As a result, prices for individual products
    are not closely related to costs. Bid skewing is especially
    problematic in this setting, since the divergence between costs and
    prices likely will result in selective fulfillment of customer
    orders. Orders for low-priced products are apt to go unfilled."

  • "The fourth problem is a lack of transparency.
    It is unclear how quantities associated with each bidder are
    determined … Bids from the last auction event were taken in
    November 2009, and now more than ten months later, we still do not
    know who won contracts. Both quality standards and performance
    obligations are unclear. This lack of transparency is unacceptable
    in a government auction and is in sharp contrast to well-run
    government auctions …

    "This collection of problems suggests that the program over time
    may degenerate into a 'race to the bottom' in which suppliers
    become increasingly unreliable, product and service quality
    deteriorates, and supply shortages become common. Contract
    enforcement would become increasingly difficult and fraud and abuse
    would grow."

    Whether Congress will step in and require CMS to change the
    course of the competitive bid program remains to be seen. What is
    clear is that 257 cosponsors of the House bill that would repeal
    the program (H.R. 3790) and continued congressional oversight
    signal that a good percentage of members of Congress are keenly
    interested in how the bid program will impact their
    communities.

    Read more Washington Wit & Wisdom
    columns. View more competitive bidding
    stories.

    A specialist in health care legislation, regulations and
    government relations, Cara C. Bachenheimer is vice president,
    government relations, for Invacare Corp., Elyria, Ohio.
    Bachenheimer previously worked at the law firm of Epstein, Becker
    & Green in Washington, D.C., and at the American Association
    for Homecare and the Health Industry Distributors Association. You
    can reach her at 440/329-6226 or cbachenheimer@invacare.com.